Titel

The Place of Law in Social Reality

In the 2020s my research has focused on social reality and the place of law in it. There are already six papers on this topic, regrettably with terminology that slightly changes from one paper to the other. A central theme in these papers is that there are two kinds of social facts. Conventional facts exist in a social group through being broadly recognised by the members of that group. Constructivist facts (or reason-based facts) exist when their existence rationally ought to be recognised by the group members on the basis of what they already recognise.

The paper Constructivist Facts as the Bridge Between Is and Ought tries to explain how the seeming gap between Is and Ought can be bridged by constructivist facts. The paper The nature of Law and Constructivist Facts aims to explain the possibility of raising questions about any legal fact by claiming that legal facts are constructivist. The paper Legal consciousness and the internal aspect of rules argues that the internal aspect of legal rules can be explained from the fact that the existence of legal rules are a matter of constructivist fact. The paper Constitutivism and social reality uses the meaningfulness of facts in social reality to explain why it is possible to draw moral conclusions from knowledge about social facts. The paper How Law's Nature Influences Law's Logic argues that the logic of law is a social phenomenon that exists in the same way, and as part of, the law. Finally, Why the debate on the Separability Thesis continues explains why the debate on the Separability Thesis can seemingly continue forever from the fact that the truth of this Thesis is a matter of constructivist fact.

Legal consciousness and the internal aspect of rules (2022)
The nature of Law and Constructivist Facts (2023)
Constructivist Facts as the Bridge Between Is and Ought (2023)
Constitutivism and social reality (2024)
How Law's Nature Influences Law's Logic (2024)
Why the debate on the Separability Thesis continues (unpublished)